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ABSTRACT 
 
Increasing attention has been devoted to understanding the process and outcomes of 
Europeanization, but the measurement of its impact and of the adaptational pressures 
involved remains elusive. Conventional constructs of Europeanization view ‘goodness of fit’ 
as a key indicator of the level of adaptational pressure. However, the number and variety 
of factors to consider casts doubt on the usefulness of this concept as a predictor of 
outcomes, as opposed to an ex post explanatory variable. 
The measurement of Europeanization and adaptational pressures can be facilitated by three 
elements: adopting an EU-wide perspective to enable a comparative assessment of impacts 
and outcomes; using a clear example of a new European level policy initiative that impacts 
on all Member States simultaneously; and a detailed knowledge of the ex ante and ex post 
situation in each Member State. The case study analysed here incorporates all these 
elements.  
In 1998 the European Commission introduced regional State aid guidelines that were 
explicitly modelled on the German approach to regional aid. From 2000 these rules were to 
be imposed on all the Member States, almost all of which had radically different regional 
aid traditions. Over the period 1998-2000, this resulted in fundamental policy reviews in 
most countries and intense negotiations between Member States and DG Competition. 
Counter-intuitively, perhaps, given the apparently very limited adaptation required, the 
most difficult negotiations concerned German regional aid, with the dispute culminating in 
Germany challenging the Commission before the European Court of Justice.  
Against this background, this article provides a cross-country analysis and evaluation of 
adaptational pressures under the 1998 regional aid guidelines. It contributes to the 
Europeanization literature by exploring the means by which policy change can be measured 
and by investigating whether the predictive capacity of ‘goodness of fit’ can be improved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The impact of the EU on national public policies has been a central theme in European 
integration theorising, not least amongst the early North American-led scholarship which 
launched the sub-discipline. Ernst Haas’s (1958) seminal study of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, devoted a whole chapter to the operation of the common market, 
focussing on the impacts of ten ECSC policy areas1 on the founding six members, 
exploring the adaptation pressures confronted and subsequent reactions (Haas 1958, 60-
110). 
A decade later, two prominent integration theorists criticised the absence of systematic 
research on EU policy implementation arguing that it was an ‘area which must receive 
more attention in the years to come … if we are really to understand the “new Europe”’ 
(Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 66). A similar deficiency was highlighted by Donald 
Puchala who coined the term “post-decisional politics” (Puchala 1975, 497-8) – 
paralleling recent definitions of Europeanization over thirty years ago! - to refer to ‘[th]e 
transmission downward and outward of regional directives from Brussels to the national 
peripheries, and the problems, pitfalls and impacts involved’.  
Further and more substantive empirical treatment of EU public policies was provided by 
European scholars, particularly by Wallace et al (1977, 1982). In setting out the 
analytical framework, Helen Wallace (1982, 44) stressed the focus on ‘the intrusion of 
Community issues into the policy processes of the member states – and their political 
repercussions’.2 Research coordinated by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988) was perhaps the 
first to provide a systematic analysis of EU policy impacts across all EU Member States 
and a range of policy areas. This was followed by an explosion of policy studies 
throughout the 1990s, notably on EU cohesion, environmental and transport policies.  
The main objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the 
Europeanization of public policy through a cross-national study of the impact of EU state 
aid policy on the EU15. There are two reasons why regional state aid policy provides a 
good case study. First, it is a highly Europeanized policy area where the Commission 
                                                 
1 It is particularly fitting in the context of this study that one of the policy areas examined by Haas 
was the ‘elimination and reduction of subsidies’ (Haas 1958, 85-88), arguably the first scholarly 
account of the Europeanization of state aid policy. 
2 Having said this, most of the chapters were mainly concerned with policy change at the EU level, 
which, as noted by Bulmer (1983, 349), ‘overshadowed some of the equally important findings 
concerning policy-making in the member states’. 
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exercises extensive legislative and executive autonomy and is expected to exert 
significant influence over the Member States. Given the high adaptational pressures 
involved, this area is ideally suited to assess empirically the degree of Europeanization 
(Risse et al 2001, 6). It is also a good case study for testing goodness-of-fit propositions, 
which are considered to offer most analytical leverage in policy areas where the mode of 
EU governance is hierarchically and compliance driven (Knill and Lehmkhul 1999, 2002; 
Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, 10).  
Second, EU state aid policy generally remains an under-researched policy area (Allen 
1977, 1983; Lavdas and Mendrinou 1995; McGowan 2000). Where it has been the object of 
scholarly enquiry, the focus has been on policy change at the EU level (e.g. Cini 2000; 
Smith 1996, 2001) or on the impacts of different EU decisions on single national cases, 
such as France (Le Galès 2001), Italy (Gualini 2003, 2004) and Germany (Thielemann 
2000). There has been no systematic comparative research exploring the impact of a 
single EU state aid policy initiative on all Member States. 
The paper is in six further sections. Section 2 presents the research design for the 
empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the historical development of regional aid control, 
culminating in the application of EU regional aid guidelines for the 2000-2006 period. To 
determine the adaptational pressures placed on Member States by the new guideline 
approach, Section 4 reviews the degree to which traditional approaches to regional aid 
mapping could be expected to fit within the guideline model. Section 5 then measures 
the adaptational responses of the Member States to the guidelines. Section 6 moves 
beyond the initial map development phase to consider the extent to which policy can be 
viewed as having been Europeanized. A final section draws together conclusions.  
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The key methodological challenge confronting empirical research on Europeanization lies 
in isolating the “net” impact of the EU on domestic institutions and policies, particularly 
in terms of separating and disentangling global (Berger and Dore 1996; Keohane and 
Milner 1996; Friedman 1999) and domestic factors from European pressures (Wallace 
2000; Hurrell and Menon 2003). A second empirical challenge is to generalise findings 
across time and space, partly due to the small number of cases typically included in such 
studies and the lack of genuinely comparative research projects. 
A number of methodological techniques can help address these challenges, including 
bottom-up research designs, process tracing, counterfactual reasoning and the use of 
more systematic comparative methods. Following the recommendations of a number of 
scholars (Radaelli 2003, Borzel 2005), this study explicitly incorporates a bottom-up 
research design, drawing on well-established approaches in the policy implementation 
literature (Lipsky 1971; Hjern and Porter 1981; Barret and Fudge 1981). More specifically, 
it combines “backward mapping” and “forward mapping” research techniques as 
proposed by Elmore (1979). The latter approach ‘begins at the top of the process, with a 
clear … statement … of the policy-makers intent. … At the bottom of the process … a 
satisfactory outcome would be … measured in terms of the original statement of intent’ 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 61  European Policies Research Centre 2
Made to Measure? Europeanization, ‘goodness of fit’ and adaptation pressures in EU competition 
policy and regional aid 
(Elmore 1979, 602). The former perspective, on the other hand, ‘begins … with a 
statement of the specific behaviour at the lowest level of the implementation process 
which generates the need for policy’ (Elmore 1979, 604).  
The empirical analysis that follows is top-down in that it examines the extent to which 
EU level policy objectives were met and explores the intervening factors which account 
for policy responses and outcomes. However, it is also strongly informed by backward 
mapping techniques as it begins with a comprehensive analysis of the starting conditions 
for designating regional aid areas in each Member State. A key advantage of this 
approach is that it allows relative precision in specifying goodness of fit and also in 
assessing the degree of Europeanization resulting from the new policy rules. 
Furthermore, ‘it does not assume that policy is the only - or even the major - influence 
on the behaviour of people engaged in the process’ (Elmore 1979, 604). The bottom-up 
approach is also apparent through the focus on how Member States have responded to EU 
pressures and in seeking to understand the internal reasons for these reactions, including 
whether Member State (as opposed to solely EU) objectives were met.  
The value of ‘process tracing’ techniques (Bennet and George 1997) are well recognised 
(Radaelli 2003, 48; Risse et al 2001, 4). This study places a particular focus on the 
sequencing of map changes. Following the overview of historical approaches to area 
designation, which provides the context for the latest policy initiatives, the analysis of 
adaptation responses and outcomes is disaggregated into three stages: the initial 
submission of regional aid maps to the Commission; negotiations with the Commission; 
and the final map submissions and outcomes. The aim is to produce a fine-grained 
analysis of adaptation and policy change across all Member States that is sensitive to 
process dynamics.  
A further strategy to demonstrate the causal importance of the EU is the use of 
counterfactual reasoning (Haverland 2005, 4-6). To more fully capture the degree of 
Europeanization, the penultimate section tries to create a counterfactual scenario. It 
compares the initial submissions with the final outcomes and explores whether 
underlying domestic policy preferences were really challenged.  
Last, this paper responds to Radaelli’s (2000, 19) call for an intensification of 
“comparative public policy analysis” in the study of Europeanization. Comparative 
methods can help overcome some of the aforementioned methodological challenges. One 
important advantage is that they allow for the testing of hypotheses and controlling of 
variables e.g. by assessing whether cases with a similar goodness of fit (independent 
variable) produce similar policy responses (dependent variable). Related, comparative 
policy analysis can facilitate the development of causal inference by placing Member 
State responses to the EU within the broader domestic and global context. The 
examination of a single public policy change across all Member States provides analytical 
leverage in measuring the independent influence of the EU, particularly, in the case 
selected, since the policy decision marked a significant departure in almost all Member 
States. Further, by increasing the number of observations, the validity of the conclusions 
drawn is enhanced. Finally, the comparative study of the EU15 can help in understanding 
differences in the scope and substance of major EU policy impacts affecting all Member 
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States. Cross-national investigation can therefore enable us to overcome “culture bound 
generalisations” (Rose 1972, 70) and broaden our depth of understanding of 
Europeanization beyond the usual suspects (e.g. the UK, France and Germany). 
The analysis is based on a detailed examination of published and unpublished 
documentation and on more than 50 semi-structured interviews with high-level 
policymakers involved in developing and negotiating aid area maps under the guidelines, 
as well as in DG Competition and DG Regio. The interviews took place between 1999 and 
2002. Intercoder reliability was employed to ensure the robustness of the analysis. 
3. THE MODEL – EU REGIONAL AID CONTROL 
The legal basis and general background to the competition policy control of state aids 
have been described in detail elsewhere.3 The essence of the Treaty provisions is that, 
although Article 87 provides for a general ban on State aids, there are two regional policy 
exceptions to this prohibition. Article 87(3)(a) allows aid in areas where the “standard of 
living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment”; Article 87(3)(c) 
enables aid for the development of certain activities or areas, where trade is not 
affected “to an extent contrary to the common interest”. These provisions have been 
extensively interpreted by the European Commission, mainly through published 
guidelines and communications.  
The development and application of these rules has not been smooth. Early on, 
Commission scrutiny was rather tentative, but in the 1970s the Commission adopted a 
series of communications on the ‘coordination’ of regional aids which introduced a 
number of principles that remain central to regional aid control: targeting aid at 
disadvantaged regions; calibrating aid levels to regional disparities; and requiring aid 
values to be measurable and comparable across countries. 
From the early 1970s, the Commission began to intervene directly in the design of 
regional aid policies. This was partly based on the Treaty requirement that Member 
States gain prior approval for any plans to offer aid or change existing schemes (Article 
88(3)) and partly on the Commission’s role in keeping State aids “under constant review” 
(Article 88(1)). However, there was no detailed published justification for Commission 
action until 1988 when the Commission outlined the method underlying its decisions to 
authorise or outlaw Member State regional aid proposals.4 Under the 1988 
Communication, Article 87(3)(a) regions were defined as NUTS II5 areas with GDP(PPS) 
per head of less than 75 percent of the EU average for the last five years for which data 
were available, while Article 87(3)(c) areas were principally determined by national 
disparities in GDP per head and unemployment rates. 
                                                 
3 See generally D’Sa (1998) and, on regional aid specifically, Wishlade (2003). 
4 Commission Communication on the method for the application of Article 92(3)(a) and (c) to 
regional aid, OJEC No. C 212 of 12 August 1988. 
5 NUTS refers to the European Nomenclature of Statistical Units which are defined across the EU at 
up to five different levels. NUTS II is equivalent to a French or Italian region or a Spanish 
Autonomous Community. 
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The Commission’s decision to publish its methodology met with a mixed response; where 
previously Member States had attacked the lack of transparency in the Commission’s 
approach, now arguments shifted to substantive issues. Around this time, the Commission 
had to review German aid map proposals following reunification. German regional policy 
relations with the Commission had always been problematic and the map discussions 
were expected to be difficult. However, the Commission recognised the domestic 
challenges created by reunification and allowed considerably more flexibility in the 
selection of aid areas than previously – provided that the agreed population coverage of 
the map (as a percentage of the national population) was not exceeded. This approach 
departed significantly from the 1988 Communication: instead of focusing on which areas 
should be designated, the population coverage of the designated areas became the key 
element of regional aid discipline. 
Given the success of this approach in Germany, DG Competition began informally to pilot 
it in subsequent map negotiations. In parallel it devised proposals for approving the 
selection of areas within the agreed population quota. It took the view that some further 
discipline over how areas were chosen was necessary to ensure that assistance was 
focused on meaningful areas of genuine need.6 Reflecting the federal domestic context, 
the German area designation system was transparent: it involved ranking labour market 
areas according to a set of agreed indicators. The Commission considered that imposing a 
similar model on all Member States would introduce the desired level of discipline and 
transparency; this philosophy underpinned the 1998 regional aid guidelines. 
There were three main features to area designation under the guidelines.7 First, the 
duration of aid area maps was limited. The authorisation of current maps was to expire 
at the end of 1999 and the new maps would apply for a fixed period (2000-2006),8 
coordinated with the phasing of Structural Funds programmes.9 This time-limited 
approach differed from the previous system under which new maps were drawn up at the 
initiative of the Member States or where aspects were revised at the instigation of the 
Commission. 
Second, an EU15 population ceiling (42.7 percent) was introduced for national aid area 
coverage; the Commission considered that this would allow coherence between national 
and Structural Funds areas while restricting coverage to less than half the anticipated 
enlarged EU population. Within this ceiling, broadly the same definition of Article 
87(3)(a) areas was applied as before - NUTS II regions with GDP(PPS) per head of less 
than 75 percent of the EU average (the definition of Objective 1 areas under the 
Structural Funds). The remaining population (under Article 87(3)(c)) was shared between 
Member States via a “quota” for each country. The global ceiling reduced overall aid 
                                                 
6 Ideally through standard geographical building blocks (ie NUTS III or labour market areas); it 
wanted to outlaw the pin-pointing of areas (like industrial estates) with economic activities but, 
often, no resident population. 
7 OJEC No. C74 of 10 March 1998 
8 Although there was scope for mid-term review if a Member State so desired. 
9 More generally, the Commission wished to see ‘coherence’ between aid maps designated for 
national and EU regional policy purposes, ensuring in particular that all areas eligible for EU 
Structural Funds should also be eligible for national regional aid. 
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area coverage significantly; prior to 1999, 46.7 percent of the EU15 population was 
contained within the designated aid areas. 
Third, while previously the Commission had focused on whether the selection of a 
particular area was justified, the 1998 guidelines made each Member State responsible 
for designating Article 87(3)(c) areas within its population quota. However, certain 
parameters constrained the method by which eligible areas could be determined: 
• the methodology had to be “objective”, and presented in a manner which enabled 
the Commission to assess its merits; 
• the indicators (up to five could be used) had to be objective, relevant and based on 
time series of at least three years; in addition, regions with a population density of 
less than 12.5 per km2 could also qualify;   
• the building blocks were to be NUTS III or, where justified, an alternative unit (such 
as labour market areas). Only one type of unit could be used; moreover, designated 
areas had to have a minimum population of 100,000; 
• the list of eligible regions had to be arranged on the basis of the chosen indicators; 
• regarding Structural Funds coherence, Objective 2 regions could be included in 
addition to areas chosen using the methodology, subject to the population ceiling 
and the 100,000 population rule (but not the building block requirement). This 
became known as the Structural Funds derogation. 
Finally, the guidelines laid down rate of award ceilings and indicated that award rates 
would be modulated to reflect the severity of the problem. 
4. THE EXPECTED FIT – PREVIOUS NATIONAL APPROACHES 
TO REGIONAL AID MAPPING 
To review how far national approaches could be expected to fit within the Commission 
model, the three main aspects of the model are considered: the timing of area 
designation exercises; map coverage; and the methodology for designating Article 
87(3)(c) areas. A final section discusses expectations with respect to goodness of fit and 
adaptational pressures. 
4.1 Timing and timescales 
Prior to the 1998 guidelines, the Commission operated a rolling map review programme. 
Map revisions could also be initiated by Member States, but this was not common since 
any new map had then to be approved by the Commission (which often sought to reduce 
coverage). Only in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands were there regular area re-
designation exercises. However, whereas the Danish and German reviews involved well-
established designation systems, the Dutch approach was specific to each review. 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 61  European Policies Research Centre 6
Made to Measure? Europeanization, ‘goodness of fit’ and adaptation pressures in EU competition 
policy and regional aid 
During the 1980s, Commission pressure for aid area cutbacks was countered by lengthy 
transitional provisions and special pleading by Member States. Just a few maps were 
processed by the Commission each year. Only at the start of the second Structural Funds 
period (1994-1999) was a concerted effort made to review virtually all maps. This 
alignment of review cycles culminated in the requirement that the Commission approve 
all maps from the start of 2000. Member States faced an end-1999 cut-off point, after 
which regional aid was unlawful until a new map was agreed. This increased the 
pressures to adapt to the Commission’s designation requirements, especially in those 
countries with no domestic tradition or established machinery for reviewing aid areas. 
In terms of timing and timescales, Member States can be divided into three groups: those 
where few problems were anticipated, either because a time-limited approach and 
established review procedures already existed (as in Denmark and Germany) or because 
the whole country was eligible for support (Greece, Ireland and Portugal); conversely, 
many were expected to face challenges (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) since map reviews had been so 
infrequent;  and last, although there was no established designation machinery in the 
Netherlands, there was at least a tradition of regular map review. 
4.2 Coverage 
From a Commission perspective, population coverage became an important measure of 
regional aid discipline from the early 1990s. For the Member States it had always been a 
background issue. Moreover, up until 1999, population reductions had generally been 
relatively modest (Yuill, Bachtler and Wishlade 1999). Set against this, the cutbacks 
demanded by the 1998 guidelines were significant. Only in Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain did overall population coverage remain stable or increase slightly. In 
contrast, Austria, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom experienced cutbacks of more 
than 20 percent. All but one of the remaining Member States faced 10-15 percent 
reductions. The exception was Germany where the cutback was just over 7 percent. In 
addition, the Article 87(3)(c) quotas in Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden were very low, 
all below 16 percent. 
4.3 Area designation methodologies 
As noted earlier, the 1998 guidelines were developed around the German area 
designation system. The two approaches were not, however, identical. While the German 
system had an objective methodology, up to five indicators and a common unit of 
assessment (labour market regions), it also contained a qualitative element which 
allowed the Länder, by means of exchange, to include other regions with acute structural 
problems. The Commission, concerned about enforcing coverage discipline, removed the 
qualitative component from the final version of the guidelines (Wishlade 2003, 81). In 
Denmark, too, an objective methodology, combining five indicators to rank 59 groups of 
planning region in a single listing, was complemented by qualitative inputs from an inter-
ministerial advisory group. Nevertheless, in both countries, quantitative aspects were 
central to the designation decision. 
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The expectation therefore was that Germany and Denmark would have few 
methodological problems with the 1998 guidelines. The same was true of Finland and 
Sweden because of the special provisions for sparsely-populated areas. Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal also had no methodological issues since their entire territory was eligible for 
support. 
In other Member States, methodological concerns were expected to be more prominent. 
In some, like Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, statistics 
were traditionally used to obtain an overview of the problem, but not in the explicit 
formalised way specified in the guidelines. In the remaining countries - Belgium, France, 
Italy and Spain - designation approaches were even more qualitative, creating obvious 
methodological challenges in compliance. 
4.4  Expected adaptational pressures 
Based on the above review, certain conclusions emerge about the broad goodness-of-fit 
of the 1998 guidelines with previous designation practice and the associated adaptational 
pressures on Member States (see Figure 1 and especially the notes thereto). Arguably the 
most important issue relates to the coverage cutback demanded. However, account also 
has to be taken of the extent to which previous designation systems were time-limited 
and had well-established designation procedures; and the methodological challenges 
posed by the guidelines. Bringing these arguments together, overall adaptational 
pressures were expected to be low in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal; medium in the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden; and high in Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK. 
5. THE ADJUSTMENTS – MEASURING ADAPTATIONAL 
RESPONSES 
This section analyses the initial map submissions under the 1998 guidelines to establish 
whether the anticipated adaptational pressures and responses (summarised in Figure 2) 
held true. Drawing on the Europeanization literature (Héritier et al 1996; Radaelli 2003; 
Borzel and Risse 2001; Schmidt 2001), Member State responses are divided into three 
groups: resistance, transformation and absorption. Responses fall under the resistance 
heading where submissions fail to comply with the guideline requirements. This may 
involve Member States retaining their original approach to policy or else adopting a 
revised approach which nevertheless does not meet the guideline stipulations. Regarding 
transformation, Member States respond to the changes required under the guidelines in 
their submissions. Finally, where there is absorption, guideline demands are 
accommodated without any significant change of approach.  
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Figure 1: Expected adaptational pressures across the Member States 
 Timing- 
related 
Coverage- 
related 
Methodology-
related 
Overall 
Austria High High Med High 
Belgium High Med High High 
Denmark Low Med Low Low 
Finland High Low Low Low 
France High Med High High 
Germany Low Med Low Low 
Greece Low Low Low Low 
Ireland Low Low Low Low 
Italy High Med High High 
Luxembourg High High Med High 
Netherlands Med Med Med Med 
Portugal Low Low Low Low 
Spain High Low High Med 
Sweden High Med Low Med 
UK High High Med High 
Key:  
Timing: Low = Time-limited approach with established procedures; plus countries where no area 
designation required; Med(ium) = Regular domestic reviews, but not time-limited nor with 
established procedures; High = Occasional reviews, no time limits. 
Coverage: Low = No cutback; Med = Cutback of between 7 percent and 15 percent; High = cutback 
of over 21 percent. 
Methodology: Low = Single rankings based on explicit indicators or no area designation 
requirement; Med = Overt, statistics-based systems with qualitative inputs; High = Essentially 
qualitative systems. 
Overall: Low = Combined score of 3-5 (with Low=1, Med=2 and High=3); Med = Combined score of 
6-7; High = Combined score of 8-9. 
 
Figure 2: Expected adaptational pressures and responses 
Expected adaptational 
pressures 
 Expected adaptational responses 
(policy change) 
High Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, UK 
Resistance (Low) 
Medium Sweden, Netherlands, Spain Transformation (High) 
Low Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal,  
Absorption (Low) 
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5.1 Measuring adaptational pressures and responses 
One overall measure of adaptational pressures is the time taken to submit map 
proposals; this can be viewed as a proxy for the ease with which maps were devised 
under the guidelines. Set against the end-March 1999 target date, there were clear 
submission difficulties in Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden (delays of seven months or 
more), and in Austria and the United Kingdom (four- to five-month delays). Only in 
Luxembourg was the delay (partially) attributable to factors external to the guidelines (a 
change of government in June 1999); elsewhere, the guidelines provided a significant 
challenge. In contrast, there were no significant delays in Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland and Spain.10 In broad terms, the delays reflect the pattern expected 
from Figure 2. The main exception is Sweden, where concern at the (unexpectedly) low 
population quota (which in effect restricted map coverage to areas of sparse population) 
meant that no map was submitted until October. During this time, the Swedish 
authorities argued (unsuccessfully) for more generous treatment. 
Submission delays are, of course, a relatively crude measure of adaptational pressures. 
At a more detailed policy level, Figure 3 assesses the initial map submissions in relation 
to the key requirements under the guidelines. It shows that timing issues were relatively 
uncontroversial. All but two countries transformed their systems to time-limited 
approaches covering the 2000-2006 period. The exceptions were Denmark (which 
absorbed the change by adjusting its time limits) and Germany. Germany resisted the 
seven-year period specified in the guidelines; instead, it submitted a 2000-2003 map, 
whilst scheduling a 2004-2006 review in line with previous domestic practice. 
Regarding coverage, most countries submitted maps that complied with their population 
quotas. For Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, this represented absorption 
since the ceilings were either unchanged or higher; in contrast, the acceptance of lower 
ceilings by Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and (after delay) Sweden 
represented transformation. However, in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom, the guideline ceilings were exceeded (resistance). In Belgium, it proved 
impossible for the regions to agree on the sub-division of the new national ceiling; 
instead, they made separate submissions which, in combination, exceeded the quota on 
the assumption that the Commission would arbitrate. In Luxembourg, the ceiling was 
exceeded by 0.2 percent of the population; the Luxembourg authorities (wrongly) 
anticipated that the Commission would agree to such flexibility. In the United Kingdom, 
ambiguity about the status of Northern Ireland was exploited; this led to the province 
being added to rather than included within the UK quota. Finally, in Germany, there was 
a rejection in principle of the new ceiling and the way in which it had been determined; 
this ultimately led to a case being brought before the European Court of Justice. 
                                                 
10 The slightly delayed (April) submissions for Greece, Ireland and Spain reflected the fact that EU 
agreement on the EU budget for 2000-06 (which impacted directly on the nature and coverage of 
regional policy in these countries) was not reached until the Berlin European Council (25 March 
1999). 
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Figure 3: Goodness-of-fit – measuring adaptational responses 
Methodology  Tim
ing 
Coverage 
U
nit 
U
se of unit 
 Indicators 
Com
posite 
ranking 
 A
w
ard rates 
  O
verall 
Austria T T A R A A T R TTT AAA 
Belgium T R R R R R R RRRRRR T 
Denmark A T A A A A T TT AAAAA 
Finland T A A R A R T RR TT AAA  
France T T T R T R R RRR TTTT 
Germany R R A R A A R RRRR AAA 
Greece T A A A A A T TT AAAAA 
Ireland T A A A A A R R T AAAAA 
Italy T T T R R R T RRR TTTT 
Luxembourg T R A A T R T RR TTT AA 
Netherlands T T R T R R R RRRR TTT 
Portugal T A A A A A R R T AAAAA 
Spain T A A A R R R RRR T AAA 
Sweden T T A A A A R R TT AAAA 
UK T R R R A R R RRRRR T A 
Key: 
R = Resistance (failure to comply); T = Transformation (policy change); A = Absorption (no need to 
change). 
Regarding methodology, the guidelines proved to be unproblematic for Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Sweden – and could be absorbed within the domestic approach to 
designation. In contrast, in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK, the submissions 
infringed the guideline methodology in all or almost all respects (as measured by the 
Commission).11 In a final group – Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Spain – the submission reflected the methodology in most but not all respects. 
Finally, with respect to rates of award, nine countries made submissions which exceeded 
the guideline stipulations. Only Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg 
submitted maps with award ceilings in line with the guidelines. While this may seem a 
high level of resistance, the guidelines were unclear on responsibility for setting rates 
and historically this task had fallen to the Commission. The French decision to submit 
higher rates than those specified in the guidelines was not resistance per se but rather 
the desire to leave unpopular arbitration to the Commission.  
                                                 
11 Commission reservations were set out in formal notices, press releases and in communications 
with the Member States. In some instances, the Member States believed their submissions were in 
line with the guideline methodology and, indeed, this was their explicit aim. The UK, for instance, 
consulted regularly with the Commission services seeking confirmation that its proposals were 
compliant. It was not until the map was submitted that it became apparent that the approach was 
not acceptable - to the considerable frustration of the UK authorities. 
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Set against the expectations of Figure 2, the predominant pattern in Figure 3 is broadly 
as anticipated for Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Portugal (where absorption was the 
standard response). It is also as expected for Belgium and the United Kingdom, where 
high adaptational pressures were anticipated, as well as in France and Italy. Less 
predictable was the relatively low resistance in Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden – 
though, in each case, this followed significant submission delays. Finally, resistance was 
much higher than anticipated in Germany and the Netherlands. The marked German 
resistance is especially noteworthy given that the guidelines were modelled on the 
German approach.  
5.2 Explaining the unexpected 
How can the unexpected outcomes in respect of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Austria and Luxembourg be explained? One explanation lies in the national significance of 
the policy area. Levels of regional aid expenditure help explain the particular importance 
of the issue to Germany and its relative lack of significance to Austria, Sweden and 
Luxembourg (Yuill, Bachtler and Wishlade 1999). However, the relatively low level of 
spend in the Netherlands leaves the Dutch resistance (as measured by Figure 3) 
unexplained. 
Another explanation concerns the nature of the coverage change required by the 
population quotas. Although the percentage cutbacks in the Netherlands and Sweden fell 
within the medium group in Figure 1, the absolute quota for both countries was very low 
– just 15 percent in the Netherlands and 15.9 percent in Sweden – significantly increasing 
the designation challenge. Sweden was also negatively influenced by the fact that the 
quota was much lower than had been implied by the pre-guideline consultations. This 
factor was also important in Germany where policymakers had expected coverage to 
increase, but actually faced a (moderate) cutback. The resulting sense of injustice 
exacerbated German resistance to the guidelines. 
A further explanatory factor derives from the ambiguity of the guidelines and, 
associated, the timing of map submissions. Some of the resistance recorded reflects a 
different understanding of the guidelines to that of the Commission (as, for instance, in 
the UK). Moreover, amongst early submitters (including the Netherlands) there was a 
belief that, as under the 1988 Communication, it would be possible to negotiate a 
compromise solution. In practice, this was not to be; on the contrary, the Commission 
was keen to highlight early instances where the guidelines were not met (to encourage 
the others). This, combined with Commission reluctance to set precedents, led to the 
Netherlands being characterised as a “resister” (see Figure 3), even though the map was 
not contentious domestically. Conversely, the late submissions from Austria, Sweden and 
Luxembourg – made after the rules of the game had become clearer – allowed maps to be 
submitted which were broadly acceptable to the Commission. 
Underlying Member State reactions was the fact that, for most, the key driver was the 
outcome of the exercise - that is, the areas actually designated for support: the central 
question was whether a guideline-derived approach could deliver ‘sensible’ maps. 
Whether Member States resisted, accepted or absorbed the changes was directly related 
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to the extent to which their overall policy objectives could be accommodated. This 
underpinned the resistance in Germany where, despite the fact that the German model 
inspired the Commission’s approach, that approach failed to meet key German goals. 
This was most obvious with respect to the population quota, but the lack of domestic 
“fine-tuning” under the guidelines (the qualitative stage of the German methodology) 
also created difficulties for the German authorities. 
6. THE FINAL CUT – MEASURING EUROPEANIZATION 
This section considers the extent to which policy can be viewed as having been 
Europeanized. The emphasis is on assessing the degree of change imposed by the 
Commission in relation to the pre-1999 position. In practice, however, the initial 
submissions of the Member States cannot be ignored when measuring Europeanization. 
Although clearly tempered by the guidelines, these submissions also reflected Member 
States’ preferences at the time - while the pre-1999 maps were often an important 
starting point for the 2000-2006 designations, changing socio-economic circumstances 
meant that, by 1999, Member State preferences were not necessarily embodied in the 
existing maps. 
Figure 4 relates the final outcomes of the negotiation process to the pre-1999 position. It 
takes the same approach as Figure 3 but, importantly, because of the need for 
Commission approval prior to implementation, there is no scope for resistance; instead, 
where there had previously been resistance, the negotiations led either to policy 
transformation on the part of the Member State or compromise (rule stretching) by the 
Commission.  
Regarding timing, there was a clear Europeanization of the scheduling of map reviews. 
Previously, only Denmark and Germany had domestically-set expiry dates. Now, the same 
(EU-determined) expiry dates apply everywhere. There was initial resistance in Germany 
to moving away from a three- to four-year review. However, the Commission thwarted 
the planned 2004-2006 review, following which Germany too has indicated that it will 
accept a seven-year review period. As mentioned earlier, a key characteristic of the pre-
1999 period was the use of lengthy transitional provisions to phase-out aid area status; 
for 2000-2006 DG Competition succeeded in imposing immediate terminal dates, in 
contrast with the arrangements for the Structural Funds and to the frustration of some 
Member States, notably France. 
On coverage, the Commission was extremely successful in imposing population ceilings on 
the Member States. The principal exception is the United Kingdom which, as noted, 
exploited the sensitivities surrounding the Northern Ireland peace process to gain 
inclusion of the province in addition to the UK allocation. This increased the UK quota by 
three percent of the national population. In Germany, the pressure to ensure that at 
least some areas could receive regional aid from 1 January 2000 led to the submission of 
a revised map which did respect the ceiling. A subsequent attempt to challenge the 
ceiling before the European Court of Justice was unsuccessful. 
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Figure 4: Europeanization - measuring policy change 
Methodology 
 
Tim
ing 
Coverage 
U
nit 
U
se of unit 
 Indicators 
Com
posite 
ranking 
 A
w
ard rates 
  O
utcom
e 
Austria T T A C A A T C TTT AAA 
Belgium T T T T T C T C TTTTTT 
Denmark A T A A A A T TT AAAAA 
Finland T A A C A C T CC TT AAA 
France T T T C T C C CCC TTTT 
Germany A T1 A T A A T TTT AAAA 
Greece T A A A A A T TT AAAAA 
Ireland T A A A A A C C T AAAAA 
Italy T T T T T C T C TTTTTT 
Luxembourg T T A A T C T C TTTT AA 
Netherlands T T C T A C T CC TTTT A 
Portugal T A A A A A C C T AAAAA 
Spain T A A A C C A CC T AAAA 
Sweden T T A A A A T TTT AAAA 
UK T C T T A C T CC TTTT A 
Notes: 
1) There was a small concession to Germany in allowing coverage to rise slightly under Article 
87(3)(c) to compensate for population decline in east Germany. 
Key:  
C = Commission compromise (rules stretched); T = Transformation (policy change); A = Absorption 
(no need to change). 
The outcome for area designation methodologies is more mixed and more difficult to 
assess. Prior to 1999, only Denmark and Germany operated single rankings of areas based 
on explicit indicators; whereas Denmark had no difficulty adjusting to the guideline 
methodology (absorption), Germany eventually had to forego the qualitative part of its 
methodology (transformation). In Greece, Ireland and Portugal, no methodological issues 
arose (since they were eligible in their entirety) and in Sweden, too, the methodology 
was straightforward given that nearly all the quota was accounted for by sparsely-
populated areas. For the remaining countries, the Commission soon appreciated that a 
wholly statistics-driven approach based on uniform units of assessment and culminating 
in a single ranking was untenable. Rule-stretching was almost universal with respect to 
composite rankings, and is apparent in Austria, Finland, France and the Netherlands in 
terms of units of assessment. 
Although timing, coverage and methodology are the core elements of change implied by 
the 1998 guidelines, a ‘technical’ assessment of the implementation of the new rules 
gives only a partial view of their impact in terms of Europeanization. A consideration of 
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the role of the pre-1999 maps in devising the initial submissions is also relevant, as is an 
assessment of the difference between the initial submissions and final outcomes.  
In a number of countries, fieldwork reveals that policymakers took the pre-1999 map as 
the basis for the 2000-2006 designation. In Spain, for example, the decision was taken 
not to de-designate any areas, but to consult with the Autonomous Communities on 
which areas should be added to the map to use up the additional population quota; the 
key task then was to find the combination of indicators which would deliver that result 
under the guideline methodology. In the Netherlands, the existing map was also central – 
with two small exceptions, the initial proposal did not include any new areas, but simply 
removed areas from the existing map to come within the population ceiling. In both 
cases, the prescribed methodology was essentially reverse-engineered to produce a map 
corresponding to domestic policy needs while meeting the population ceilings. In this 
sense, some apparent transformation from a technical perspective conceals a high degree 
of absorption with respect to map outcomes.  
For several countries, there were protracted negotiations between the initial submission 
and the final map (see Figure 5). In some cases, the Commission opened the formal 
investigative procedure; in others, the process was informal. For a majority of countries, 
more than one map was submitted. However, the length and heat of the negotiations, 
the number of submissions made and the depth of formal scrutiny are not necessarily 
indicative of the scale of change wrought by the Commission.  
Figure 5: Timing, procedures, proposals and the significance of change 
 Months from 
initial 
submission to 
approval 
Article 88 
investigative 
procedure 
Number of maps 
submitted 
Significance of 
change  
Austria 10  3 Not significant 
Belgium 16 Y 2 Significant 
Denmark 7  1 None 
Finland 7  1 None 
France 9 Y 2 Not significant 
Germany 12 Y 2 Significant 
Greece 8  1 None 
Ireland 6  1 None 
Italy 9 Y 2 Not significant 
Luxembourg 7  2 Not significant 
Netherlands 16 Y 3 Not significant 
Portugal 13 Y 1 None 
Spain 12  1 None 
Sweden 5  1 None 
UK 12  2 Significant 
Note: Significance of change refers to the differences between the initial proposal and the 
approved map. 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 61  European Policies Research Centre 15
Made to Measure? Europeanization, ‘goodness of fit’ and adaptation pressures in EU competition 
policy and regional aid 
Only in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom were the changes required by the 
Commission significant. For Belgium, the initial submission had essentially comprised 
three distinct proposals (one from each region) which neither respected the population 
quota nor met the single methodology requirement; the ultimate proposal was therefore 
significantly different, imposing a unified designation methodology on a country where 
there is no national-level responsibility for regional policy. In the German case, as noted, 
the national authorities ultimately surrendered to pressure to respect the population 
ceiling – a cutback of over 4 million people. In addition, DG Competition refused to allow 
the splitting of units (the qualitative stage of the traditional German methodology), even 
through the use of the Structural Funds derogation (which it permitted, and even 
encouraged, elsewhere). In the United Kingdom, DG Competition opposition to the initial 
proposals resulted in a major reworking of the statistical analyses to increase the 
‘compactness’ of the map, involving a transfer of around 1 million people between the 
original and the amended maps. 
A more qualitative indicator of Europeanization may be gleaned from policymaker 
perceptions. For some countries, the process of agreeing an aid area map with the 
Commission seems to have been regarded as tiresome, rather than troublesome; for 
example, in Austria and France, policymakers characterised the negotiations as long, 
rather than difficult. In neither country were significant changes ultimately required. By 
contrast, in Germany, the changes imposed by the Commission were regarded as a 
serious interference in domestic policy. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the original 
map was considered to be a successful attempt to combine the Commission guidelines 
with the labour market aims of UK regional policy, while the revised map was viewed as a 
substantial compromise of national regional policy objectives. 
Some measure of Europeanization may also be established by considering to what extent 
the Commission’s priorities were met. Clearly, there was a high level of compliance 
regarding timing and coverage but, with respect to area designation methodologies, the 
picture is more nuanced. Moreover, there is widespread evidence of Member States 
exploiting the Structural Funds derogation to gain approval for national priority areas 
which did not meet the guideline requirements on uniform geographical units. This in 
turn raises the question of “whose Europeanization is it anyway”? DG Regio had given a 
high priority to the ‘coherence’ of assisted areas – in this instance meaning that 
Structural Funds areas should also be eligible for national regional aid; in contrast, DG 
Competition never viewed this as an important objective. The compromise Structural 
Funds derogation came to be used by Member States for national rather than European 
ends; Member States designated areas for Structural Funds purposes just so that they 
could be included in the domestic regional aid map.  
A complication in measuring Europeanization is the degree of discretion exercised by the 
Commission. Some negotiations forced Member States to change their proposals to fit the 
guidelines and compromised national preferences - as in the UK and Germany. In others, 
the emphasis was on finding ways of accommodating proposals within the guidelines, 
especially through the Structural Funds derogation – as in Finland, France and Spain; 
however, use of the derogation was explicitly denied to Germany. The uneven 
application of the guidelines partly explains the differing timescales for decision-making, 
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with potentially controversial precedents being held back. More pertinent, the 
measurement of Europeanization is clearly more complex in circumstances where 
European constraints are not imposed uniformly. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the application of the 1998 regional aid guidelines to gain 
comparative insights into how and to what extent Europeanization has taken place and 
can be measured. It has also considered the degree to which the adaptational pressures 
which Member States experience can be measured in practice and the relevance of 
goodness-of-fit to predicting adaptational responses.  
The analysis has established that goodness-of-fit propositions provide relatively poor 
predictive capacity with respect to adaptation responses. Further aspects which need to 
be taken into account include: the significance of the policy area for the Member State; 
Member State expectations regarding the new policy; the level of understanding of 
Commission requirements; the clarity of policy objectives; and the fit with overarching 
domestic policy priorities. 
This paper has shown that a number of well-established techniques can help address the 
challenge of measuring causality in empirical research. These include bottom-up research 
designs, process tracing, counterfactual reasoning and the use of more systematic 
comparative methods. Nevertheless, an over-emphasis of those aspects of policy that are 
susceptible to measurement runs the risk of bogus precision.  
The reality is that the policy environment is neither static nor uniform. The 1998 regional 
aid guidelines did not emerge from a vacuum but rather have evolved since the 1970s: 
each EU enlargement has affected the regional aid policies of the acceding countries; as 
important, each enlargement has altered EU regional aid control policy. The guidelines 
are therefore a landmark in an ongoing process, rather than an endpoint against which 
final outcomes can be measured. Moreover, the substantive results confirm the role of 
bottom-up processes in shaping outcomes (Méndez, Wishlade and Yuill 2006). Of key 
importance, a thorough analysis of the process demonstrates not only that application of 
the guidelines by DG Competition was uneven on key issues, but also that DG Regio 
objectives were partially subverted, raising wider issues about the ‘ownership’ of 
Europeanization.  
These characteristics make the measurement of Europeanization akin to the pursuit of a 
mobile and metamorphosing target. The measurement of Europeanization can be 
facilitated by adopting a comparative assessment of impacts and outcomes, the use of a 
clear policy initiative that impacts on all Member States simultaneously and a detailed 
knowledge of the ex ante and ex post situation in each Member State. However, perhaps 
perversely, such a comprehensive and forensic approach also reveals the limitations of 
essentially reductionist methods of measuring policy change. A qualitative understanding 
of the complexities and dynamics of policy, and of the wider context, is an indispensable 
complement to quantitative approaches; policy researchers ignore this at their peril. 
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